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Abstract—We investigate a family of bugs in blockchain-based
smart contracts, which we call event-ordering (or EO) bugs. These
bugs are intimately related to the dynamic ordering of contract
events, i.e., calls of its functions on the blockchain, and enable
potential exploits of millions of USD worth of Ether. Known
examples of such bugs and prior techniques to detect them have
been restricted to a small number of event orderings, typicall 1
or 2. Our work provides a new formulation of this general class
of EO bugs as finding concurrency properties arising in long
permutations of such events.
The technical challenge in detecting our formulation of EO
bugs is the inherent combinatorial blowup in path and state space
analysis, even for simple contracts. We propose the first use of
partial-order reduction techniques, using happen-before relations
extracted automatically for contracts, along with several other
optimizations built on a dynamic symbolic execution technique.
We build an automatic tool called ETHRACER that requires no
hints from users and runs directly on Ethereum bytecode. It flags
7-11% of over ten thousand contracts analyzed in roughly 18.5
minutes per contract, providing compact event traces that human
analysts can run as witnesses. These witnesses are so compact
that confirmations require only a few minutes of human effort.
Half of the flagged contracts have subtle EO bugs, including
in ERC-20 contracts that carry hundreds of millions of dollars
worth of Ether. Thus, ETHRACER is effective at detecting a subtle
yet dangerous class of bugs which existing tools miss.
I. INTRODUCTION
A blockchain/cryptocurrency protocol enables a distributed
network of mutually-untrusting computational nodes (miners)
to agree on the current state and complete history of a
replicated public ledger. The dominant consensus algorithm
was invented to facilitate decentralized payments in virtual
currencies [29], but it has since been extended to the decentral-
ized applications commonly known as smart contracts [40]. A
typical smart contract on a blockchain is a stateful program,
i.e., a package of code and the mutable data that describes
the contract’s current state, similar to an object in an OOP
language. Both the code and the data are stored in a replicated
fashion on the blockchain. Every smart contract transaction
(invocation of contract code) is totally ordered, as agreed upon
by a majority of miners, and replicated across the system.
Smart contracts implement some domain-specific logic to
act as automatic and trustworthy mediators. Typical applica-
tions include multi-party accounting, voting, arbitration mech-
anisms, auctions, and puzzle-solving games with distribution
of rewards. The dominant smart contract-enabled blockchain
today is Ethereum [42], whose native token Ether has a
market capitalization over 20.5 billion USD.1 Over a million
1As of this writing, one Ether is 203 USD.
smart contracts have been deployed to Ethereum’s blockchain.
Numerous publicly reported attacks have resulted in hundreds
of millions dollars’ worth of Ether being stolen or otherwise
lost [10], [22]. Further, contracts cannot be patched once
deployed. This emphasizes the importance of pre-deployment
security audit and analysis of smart contracts.
This paper investigates a class of vulnerabilities in smart
contracts that arise due to their inherent concurrent execution
model. Contracts can be invoked by multiple users concur-
rently, and the ordering of multiple submitted transactions is
non-deterministically decided by miners through a consensus
protocol. Contracts can invoke other contracts synchronously
and call off-chain services asynchronously which return in
no pre-determined order. As Ethereum contracts are stateful,
mutations of contract data persist between invocations. There-
fore, predicting the result from a set of transactions invoking
a contract requires reasoning about the non-deterministic or-
der of concurrently-interacting transactions. Developers often
write contracts assuming a certain serialized execution order
of contracts, missing undesirable behaviors only observable
in complex interleavings. Such reasoning has classically been
difficult for human auditors. Accordingly, tools that allow
developers, auditors, and smart contract users to increase
confidence that contracts behave as expected are useful.
Certain concurrency bugs in Ethereum smart contract are
known. For instance, prior work has highlighted how a pair
of transactions, when reordered, can cause contracts to exhibit
differing Ether transfers as output [22]. Similarly, susceptibil-
ity of contracts to asynchronous callbacks has been identified
previously [4], [34]. However, the full generality of bugs
arising from unexpected ordering of events — i.e. calls to
contract functions invoked via transactions and callbacks —
has neither been systematically tested nor fully understood yet.
The key encumbering challenge is that analyzing contracts
under multiple events spread over many transactions leads to
combinatorial blowup in state-space to be checked. Existing
tools are thus designed to avoid search of large path space,
by checking for properties of often single or a pair of events.
For instance, the infamous re-entrancy bugs such as theDao
can be found with checking if a function can call itself within
a single transaction execution [16], while transaction ordering
bugs reported by the OYENTE tool check a pair of events [22].
Problem & Approach. In this work, we develop new and
efficient analysis techniques for Ethereum smart contracts
under multiple events. Our work generalizes beyond several
previous classes or errors into a broader category of concur-
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rency errors we call event-ordering (EO) bugs. The core idea
is to check whether changing the ordering of input events
(function invocations) of a contract results in differing outputs.
If a contract exhibits differing outputs under reordered input
events, it is flagged as an EO bug; otherwise, event re-ordering
produces no impact on outputs and so the contract is EO-safe.
Our formulation of EO bugs deepens the connection be-
tween contracts and concurrent objects in traditional pro-
gramming languages [16], [34]. Specifically, we show how
to directly juxtapose the events of a contract with atomic
operations of shared memory objects. This results in phrasing
properties of contracts directly as traditional concurrency
properties. For instance, we observe that asynchronous calls to
off-chain services follow a call/return pattern and can lead to
a violation of linearizability [17], [35]. Further, we show that
contracts are susceptible to event races because of improper
enforcement of synchronization properties [12], [33]. We find
hundreds of live contracts with previously unknown errors,
highlighting that programmers often desire these properties
but fail to enforce them in implementation.
To tackle combinatorial path and state explosion, we
develop a number of optimization techniques. Furthering
the “contracts-as-concurrent-objects” analogy, we show that
partial-order reduction techniques can be applied to contract
analysis. Specifically, if two functions can only be invoked
in certain order (or else an exception results), or re-ordering
a set of functions yields the same output, then event com-
binations eliminate repeatedly enumerating such sequences.
This concept is captured by the classical happens-before (HB)
relation [21]. Unlike traditional programming languages which
have explicit synchronization primitives, smart contracts try
to implement desirable concurrency controls using ad-hoc
program logic and global state. We show how to recover the
intrinsic HB-relation encoded in contract logic, and that it
substantially reduces the event combinations to check.
ETHRACER. Our central practical contribution is an automatic
tool to find EO bugs called ETHRACER. We use it to mea-
sure the prevalence of these vulnerabilities over ten thousand
contracts. Less than 1% of live contracts are accompanied
by source code; hence, our tool does not require source and
analyzes Ethereum bytecode directly. This enables third-party
audit and testing of contracts without source. We take a dy-
namic testing approach, constructing inputs and systematically
trying all possible function orderings until a budgeted timeout
is reached. Done naı¨vely, this approach would quickly lead
to an intractable analysis even for relatively small contracts,
since N function calls to a contract can have N ! orderings.
Our approach combines symbolic execution of contract events
with fast randomized fuzzing of event sequences. Our key
optimizations exponentially reduce the search space by elimi-
nating orderings which violate the recovered HB-relation be-
tween events or re-order pure (side-effect-free) events. Further,
ETHRACER prioritizes the search for linearizability violations
in asynchronous callbacks. ETHRACER reports only true EO
violations, accompanied by witnesses of event values that can
be concretely executed.
Empirical Results. First, we show that most contracts do
not exhibit differences in outputs, and that when contracts
do exhibit different outputs upon re-ordering, they are likely
to have an unintended behavior in more than 50% of cases.
We find a total of 789 (7.89%) violations of synchronization
properties and 47 (11%) violations of linearizability properties
in our analysis of over ten thousand contracts. Therefore, our
formulation of properties catches a subtle and dangerous class
of EO bugs, without excessively triggering alarms.
Second, we show that our characterization of EO bugs sub-
stantially generalizes beyond bugs known from prior works. A
direct comparison to prior work on OYENTE, which focuses
on specific sub-class of synchronization violations, shows that
ETHRACER find all the 78 true EO bugs Oyente finds and
many more (674 in total) which are not detected by prior
work. Similarly, it finds 47 linearizability violations that are
not captured by any prior work, generalizing this class of errors
beyond DAO-style re-entrancy [10] or id-tracking bugs that fail
to pair asynchronous calls and callbacks [34]. We find many
bugs in popular ERC-20 [13] compliant contract (ubiquitously
used for “ICO”s), casino/lottery, bounties, contests, and escrow
service contracts. The flagged contracts include both old and
recent; these contracts have processed millions of transactions,
holding hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Ether over
their lifetime. The results stem directly from our efficiency-
enhancing techniques — for 95% of the contracts we analyzed,
ETHRACER produced results at an average of 18.5 minutes per
contract.
Lastly, our ETHRACER minimizes human effort in anal-
ysis of results. When ETHRACER reports EO violations, it
provides concrete witnesses that exhibit differing outputs.
Typically there are very few (e.g., 1–3) cases that require
human inspection to confirm and fix, a process that typically
requires only a few minutes per contract. Since contracts are
not patchable after deployment, we believe that ETHRACER
is useful auditing tool: it flags about 7–11% of contracts it
analyzes, reporting less 1–3 witnesses for analysts to inspect,
over half of which have yielded subtle EO bugs.
II. MOTIVATION
A. Ethereum Smart Contracts
Smart contracts in Ethereum are identified by addresses.
An Ethereum user invokes a particular function of a smart
contract by creating a signed transaction to the contract’s
address. The transaction specifies which function is being
executed and its arguments. The user submits the transaction
to the Ethereum network, and at some point in the future,
a miner in the network chooses to process the transaction.
Accordingly, the miner takes the current state of the contract
from the blockchain, executes the called function, and stores
the updated state of the contract back into the blockchain.
It is entirely possible for two users to submit transactions
that interact with the same contract at the same time. Neither
of the users knows which transactions will first be processed
by the miners. What is guaranteed is that if a user’s transaction
is incorporated into the blockchain, then its effect will be
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reflected atomically. In other words, a miner will not execute
part of the first transaction, switch to running the second at
some intermediate contract state, and then return to finish off
the remaining computation in the first transaction. It is easy
to assume that this transaction atomicity removes the need to
reason about the concurrent execution environment, but this is
not the case, as we explain next.
B. Event-Ordering Bugs
Contracts can be seen as objects with mutable state and
set of interfaces for users to access it. As explained, their
interfaces can be invoked by many users simultaneously; the
order in which the “calls” will be invoked is determined
entirely by the mining network. Phrased this way, one can
readily see the analogy between concurrent data structures
in traditional programming languages and smart contracts.
Traditional programming languages provide programming ab-
stractions to allow concurrent data structures to ensure certain
desired properties. We explain two properties here which are
desirable by smart contracts, violations of which result in
errors defined as event-ordering (or EO) bugs.
Linearizability. Linearizability is a well-known property used
in concurrent data structures [17]. Loosely stated, it means that
an operation should appear to execute atomically or instanta-
neously from each user’s view. A simple example of this is
the operation of incrementing a global counter, shared between
two threads in a classical programming language. The counter
implementation reads the counter value, increment by one,
and write the result back. If two users invoke simultaneously
when the counter value is zero, a poor implementation may
result in a final value of 1 rather than 2, if reads of two
user requests execute before both the writes; the last write
would overwrite the other. Linearizability guarantees that no
interleavings would result in such outcome. Specifically, the
result should match the sequential execution of one request
being served after another, either order being legal. Traditional
language and hardware instructions, such as atomic swap
and compare-and-exchange operations, allow programmers to
achieve linearizability through mutual exclusion.
Ethereum contracts desire linearizability, but the transaction
atomicity provided by the platform does not guarantee it.
Consider the Casino snippet in Figure 1, which was simplified
from a real game-of-chance smart contract. Casino accepts
bets from one or more players and, with 200-to-1 odds
(Line 14), repays winners 100 fold (Line 15). The Casino
aims to be honest, so it rejects any bet that it would be
unable to honor if won (Line 5). The fairness of any game of
chance depends crucially on how random values are generated.
Casino utilizes a trusted off-chain random number generator
which is invoked by the Oraclize API [31] query (Line 6).
The random-number oracle is not actually queried in Line 6;
instead calling oraclize_query does two things: generates
the unique transaction id tag oid and notifies a trusted off-
chain monitor (the Oraclize service) that Casino wishes to
query the random-number oracle for transaction oid. Due
to the semantics of Ethereum, the off-chain monitor will
1 contract Casino {
2 ...
3 function bet() payable {
4 // make sure we can pay out the player
5 if (address(this).balance < msg.value * 100 )
throw;
6 bytes32 oid = oraclize_query(...); // random
7 bets[oid] = msg.value;
8 players[oid] = msg.sender;
9 }
10
11 function __callback(bytes32 myid, string result)
12 onlyOraclize onlyIfNotProcessed(myid) {
13 ...
14 if (parseInt(result) % 200 == 42)
15 players[myid].send( bets[myid] * 100 );
16 }
17 ...
18 }
Fig. 1: Contract Casino with a linearizability violation
be notified only once Casino’s code has finished running
(Line 9). Before this occurs, Casino stores transaction-related
information for its later retrieval (Lines 7–8). Later, once
the off-chain oracle has been queried, the off-chain Oraclize
service will make a fresh call back into the Ethereum chain
at Casino’s callback function __callback (Line 11).
The __callback function “returns” asynchronously. After
an initial bettor initiates an oracle query, other bettors can
place their bets while the off-chain oracle is queried. These fur-
ther wagers will initiate further oracle queries, and depending
on the behavior of the off-chain oracles, their corresponding
callbacks may not be invoked in the same order as they are
called. The designers of the Oraclize API are aware of this,
which is why each transaction is given a unique ID that is both
returned from oraclize_query (Line 6) and passed to the
callback (the myid parameter in Line 11), thereby “pairing”
the two. Failing to pair callbacks can lead to previously-
published vulnerabilities [34], but this error is avoided by
Casino by the use of myId in Line 15, which carefully
disambiguates bets from multiple users.
Even though the call/return are correctly paired, there
is a bug that can occur when multiple players place bets
concurrently. Suppose that the contract currently has 100
Ether and that two players wish to bet 1 Ether. Consider the
following execution of functions: 〈bet1; bet2; __callback1;
__callback2〉, where the subscript denotes the paired iden-
tifier (oid/myId) in the Oraclize interface. Both bets are
accepted (Line 5), but if both bets win (Line 14), player
two will not be paid in full. A fairer Casino implementation
should have considered all pending bets when determining if
it can accept another.
This example highlights exactly why linearizability is
desirable—the call-return of Oraclize calls for two users
should appear to execute sequentially (or atomically). This
contract yields differing outputs if the responses of call-
backs are received out-of-order. The ordering presented above
yields an insufficient balance after paying off player 1
(Line 15). In the alternative ordering 〈bet1; __callback1;
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1 contract IOU {
2 // Approves the transfer of tokens
3 function approve(address _spender, uint256 _val) {
4 allowed[msg.sender][_spender] = _val;
5 return true;
6 }
7 // Transfers tokens
8 function transferFrom(address _from, address _to,
9 uint256 _val) {
10 require(
11 allowed[_from][msg.sender] >= _val
12 && balances[_from] >= _val
13 && _val > 0);
14 balances[_from] -= _val;
15 balances[_to] += _val;
16 allowed [_from][msg.sender] -= _val;
17 return true;
18 }
19 }
Fig. 2: Contract IOU with a synchronization violation
bet2; __callback2〉, bet2 will decline the second bet due to
the check on Line 5, making Casino fair.
Synchronization. Synchronization is the idea that two pro-
cesses order their execution, such that certain operations
execute in a desired order. The classical example of this is
the producer-consumer problem for a shared queue, where
a producer process should not write to a full buffer, and
a consumer process does not read out of an empty one.
Typically, synchronization is implemented with abstractions
such as semaphores in traditional languages.
Smart contracts implicitly desire to order multiple user
requests in a particular sequence, but sometime fail to. As an
example, Figure 2 shows a shortened version of a contract that
implements ERC-20-compliant tokens in Ethereum dubbed
“IOU”s. As of today, ERC-20-compliant contracts manage
tokens valued in the billions of USD. The snippet in Figure 2
allows an owner “O” of IOUs to delegate control of a certain
_val of IOU tokens to a specified _spender “S’’ (e.g., an
expense account). O calls the approve function (Line 3) to
allocate _val IOU tokens to S, and the function transferFrom
allows S to send a portion (_val) of the IOU allocation to
an address of S’s choice (_to). The approver is allowed to
update the allocation any time: for instance, O may initially
approve 300 IOU and later reduce the amount to 100 by calling
approve again. Although this may seem like a reasonable
idea, as pointed out on public forums [1], this contract has
undesirable semantics, since S can execute a transferFrom
between the two calls to approve, thereby spending the first
allocation of 100 and then having another 100 to spend. In
other words, two different executions of calls to approve and
transferFrom lead to different outcomes:
Execution 1 Execution 2
approveO(S, 300) approveO(S, 300)
approveO(S, 100) transferFromS(O, S, 100)
transferFromS(O, S, 100) approveO(S, 100)
S has spent 100 and S has spent 100 and
can spend 0 more can spend 100 more
The community has proposed a fix that corresponds directly
to the desired synchronization property: forbidding a change
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Fig. 3: Main components of ETHRACER.
an allocation once made [1]. The recommendation ensures that
all calls to transferFrom by all users should be permitted
strictly after all approve have happened. Newer ERC-20
contracts have deployed this fix and behave more reasonably if
such order is enforced, since the second approve is rejected
in the second ordering.
III. OVERVIEW
We define a class of bugs which we call event-ordering
bugs, generalizing the examples presented in Section II. We
explain the inherent path and state space exploration complex-
ity, and propose our design to address these systematically.
A. Problem
A contract function can be invoked by an external transac-
tion, an internal call from another contract, or via an off-chain
asynchronous callbacks. We call these invocations as events.
Under a received event, a contract executes atomically, which
we call as run. A sequence of events invokes a sequence of
contract runs, which is referred to as a trace in this paper.
Each run of a contract can modify its Ether balance and global
state which is stored on the blockchain, as well as generate
new transactions that transfer Ether or call other contracts. We
say that the output of a run or a trace are values of the contract
balance, state, and any resulting transactions. We define these
terms more precisely in Section IV-A.
An event-ordering (EO) bug exists in a contract if two
different traces, consisting of the same set of concrete events,
produce different outputs. These bugs may arise as a result of
violations of both linearizability and synchronization proper-
ties. We seek to check if a given smart contract has an event-
ordering (EO) bug.
Note that our problem formulation is more general than
previous works which introduced a sub-class of synchroniza-
tion mistakes called transaction ordering bugs (TOD) [22]
(see Section VI-D for details). TOD bugs capture only a pair
of events and are restricted only to differences in contract’s
balance. Our EO bug formulation is also orthogonal to the
concept of re-entrancy bugs, such as the infamous DAO, since
it does not correspond to re-ordering of events. A re-entrancy
bug occurs when a contract exhibits different outputs under
two different values of a single event, one of which outputs a
transaction which could subsequently cause a critical function
to re-enter itself. Re-entrancy bugs are detected by several
tools that analyze runs from different values for a single
event [16], [22].
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Our goal is to efficiently check if re-ordering of input events
of a contract across multiple transactions leads to differing out-
puts. We design a novel analysis technique and an automatic
tool called ETHRACER to find such contracts. As shown in
Figure 3, ETHRACER works directly on the EVM bytecode of
Ethereum smart contracts, given as input along with the public
blockchain data. When an EO violation is detected, the output
of ETHRACER is minimally two traces, consisting of at least
two distinct events, which concretely exhibit different outputs
when executed on the Ethereum virtual machine (EVM) from
the given blockchain state.
Intent vs. Bugs. Unlike vulnerabilities arising due to language
design, such as memory safety, the bugs uncovered in the
present work tend to arise from logical errors between a
contract’s intended behavior and its actual implementation.
Smart contracts are usually deployed anonymously and with-
out public documentation; the true motivations for their de-
ployment can be very obscure. It is possible that our flagged
test cases detected as having output differences are desired
by the developer. Without documentation, to say nothing
of a formal specification, it is difficult to give a precise
definition for “intended behavior”, forcing us to fall back on
the notion of “know a bug when we see it” [39]. In reality, the
debate between intention and formal behavior is sometimes so
contentious that it is resolved in the community by agreeing
on a so-called hard fork [10].
Therefore, our focus in this work is merely on efficient
analysis techniques that minimize the number of test configu-
rations the developer or potential user has to manually inspect,
before the contract is deployed irrevocably.
B. Our Solution
We take a dynamic testing approach to finding EO bugs.
This is primarily motivated by our goal to produce concrete
witnesses that human analysts can replay to inspect and
confirm EO bugs with no false violations. The technical barrier
to finding reordering bugs is that the path and the state space
of the analysis blows up combinatorially. To illustrate this, we
consider a baseline solution that (say) can reason about the
behavior of the contract under different values of a single input
event. One effective state-of-the-art technique for such analysis
is based on dynamic symbolic execution (DSE), implemented
by many existing analyses for contracts [18], [19], [30].
In concept, such a DSE engine can enumerate different
paths and input values (symbolically) in the program, start-
ing from one event entry point function, and check if two
different paths could lead to different outputs. However, this
baseline solution does not address the class of EO bugs sought
directly. EO bugs are a result of two or more events with
possibly different entry points, leading to two different paths
and outputs. Therefore, even with a powerful DSE engine,
checking the space of N events requires reasoning about traces
with all N ! permutations of these events. Different traces can
result in different intermediate values global variables or states,
leading to different paths. Enumerating such a path space is
prohibitively expensive; for instance, even a (relatively short)
sequence of calls to the contract with (say) 20 functions
callable via events can have millions of traces to inspect.2
Therefore, we seek techniques that can eliminate a large part of
this path and state space exploration, making search tractable.
Key Ideas. The first observation is that contract functions are
often written in a way that have a certain intended order of
valid execution. Executing them in a different order simply
results in the contract throwing an exception. This can be
captured as a partial-order between events or as a happens-
before (or hb) relation. Two events e1 and e2 are in a hb
relation if executing them in one order produces a valid trace
while the other is invalid. The insight is that if we find
pairs of events e1 and e2 that are in hb(e1, e2) relation, all3
permutations of events involving these in an invalid order
will result in exception—therefore, these are redundant to test
repeatedly. To maximize the benefit of this observation, we
augment the baseline DSE to recognize events which are in
the hb relation. The symbolic analysis reasons about a large
set of event values encoded as symbolic path constraints,
which helps to identify partially-ordered events much better
than fuzzing with concrete values. We present our novel and
efficient algorithm to extract a new notion of hb relations we
define in Section IV-C.
Our second observation is that certain events produce the
same outputs irrespective of which order they appear in any
trace. A simple, but highly effective, optimization in our
experiments is to recognize events runs that do not write or
read global state. Such events can be arbitrarily re-ordered
without changing outputs, so testing permutations that simply
re-order these is unnecessary. Similarly, events that do not
write to any shared global state can be arbitrarily re-ordered.
Hence, they are also not considered for extracting HB relation.
The final key observation deals primarily with optimiz-
ing for linearizability violations. This optimization aims to
prioritize the search for event traces involving asynchronous
callbacks and reduces flagging EO violations that may be
benign. If we only consider traces where each Oraclize and
its matching callbacks are sequentially or atomically executed,
these orders likely yield intended (benign) outputs. Such
traces, in which events corresponding to different user requests
are not “out-of-order”, are defined as linearizable. We explain
this concept of linearizability more precisely as applied to
contracts in Section IV-D. The task of analysis reduces to
finding if there exist traces that do not produce outputs same
as that of some linearizable trace. Orders which result in
the same output as a linearizable traces are likely not bugs
(can be suppressed in reporting), and those which produce
differing outputs are flagged as an EO bug. So, our search
procedure prioritizes constructing linearizable traces first and
then symbolically analyzing for event runs which may yield
different outputs to those linearizable traces.
2E.g., for a typical contract with 20 functions, each with 2 different inputs,
the number of traces composed of 6 events is C6
(20·2·6) ≈ 238.
3The savings can be exponential, since there are exponentially many
permutations with a shared pair of re-ordered functions.
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In summary, ETHRACER uses the baseline DSE technique
to prune and prioritize its search in the path space of runs in
multi-event traces. The final concrete values generated from
DSE are run on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) from the
provided blockchain state. As a result, in practice, testing for
EO bugs takes about 18.5 minutes for 95% with ETHRACER
with traces of length 6, and can be configured to test for longer
traces arbitrarily. We detail the tool design details in Section II.
IV. ETHRACER DESIGN
The notion of concurrency in contracts requires a careful
mapping to the familiar concepts of concurrency. We begin
by recalling the contract concurrency model and by precisely
defining terminology used informally thus far. We utilize the
notation used in a distilled form of Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) semantics called ETHERLITE calculus [22]. Then, we
move to design detail of our tool ETHRACER.
A. Contract Concurrency Model & Terminology
Recall that each event executes atomically and determinis-
tically in Ethereum [42]. A miner runs the contract function,
conceptually as a single thread, with provided inputs of an
event until it either terminates or throws an exception.4 If it
terminates successfully, all the changes to the global variables
of that execution are committed to the blockchain; if an
exception is thrown, none of the changes during the execution
under that event are committed to the blockchain. In this
sense, the execution of one event is atomic. The source of
concurrency lies in the non-deterministic choices that each
miner makes in ordering transaction in a proposed block.
Contract states and instances. We recall the definitions of
global blockchain state, contracts and messages from ETHER-
LITE calculus by Luu et al. [22].
A global blockchain state σ is encoded as a finite partial
mapping from an account id to its balance and contract code
M and its mutable state, mapping the field names fld to
the corresponding values, which both are optional (marked
with “?”) and are only present for contract-storing blockchain
records. We refer to the union of a contract’s field entries
fld 7→ v and its balance entry bal 7→ z as a contract state ρ,5
and denote a triple c = 〈id ,M, ρ〉 of a contract with an
account id , the code of which is M and state is ρ, as contract
instance c.
σ , id 7→ {bal : N; code? 7→M ; fld? 7→ v}
Messages (ranged over by m) are encoded as mappings from
identifiers to heterogeneous values. In particular, each message
stores the identity of its sender and destination (to), the amount
value of Ether being transferred (represented as a natural
number), a contract function name to be invoked, as well as
4Here, we do not draw a difference between different origins of exceptions,
i.e., those raised programmatically or those triggered by insufficient gas.
5We will also overload the notation, referring to a state ρ of a contract id
in a blockchain state σ as ρ = σ[id ], thus, ignoring its code component.
auxiliary fields (data) containing additional arguments for a
contract function, which we will be omitting for brevity.
m , {sender 7→ id ; to 7→ id ′; value : N; fname : string ; data 7→ ...}
We will refer to a value of an entry x of a message m as m.x.
Contract Events. The notion of events captures external
inputs that can force control into an entry point of a contract,
and defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Events). An event e for a contract instance
c = 〈id ,M, ρ〉 is a pair 〈fn,m〉, where fn is a name of a
function, defined in M , and m is a message passed containing
arguments to fn , such that fn = m.fname.6
Below, we will often refer to the m-component of an event
as its context. Our contract events are coarse-grained: they
are only identified by entry points and inputs to a specific
contract. Event executions of a contract may invoke other
contracts, which only return values as parameters. Externally
called contracts may modify their own local state, but such
external state is not modelled.
Event runs and traces. The run of an event e at a contract
instance c = 〈id ,M, ρ〉 brings it to a new state ρ′, denoted
ρ
e−→ ρ′. A sequence of events is called an event trace. An
evaluation of contract at instance ρ0 over an event trace h
yielding instance ρn is denoted as ρ0
h
=⇒ ρn = ρ0 e1−→
. . .
en−→ ρn, which can be obtained by executing all events
from h consecutively, updating the global blockchain state
correspondingly between the steps. Some evaluations may halt
abnormally due to a runtime exception, denoted as ρ h=⇒  .
We call such h invalid traces (at ρ). Conversely, valid traces
evaluate at instance ρ0 without an exception to a well-formed
state ρn, which is implicit when we write ρ
h
=⇒ ρn. We now
define an event ordering bug.
Definition 2 (Event-ordering bug). For a fixed contract in-
stance c = 〈id ,M, ρ0〉, a blockchain state σ, such that
σ[id ] = ρ0, a pair of valid event traces h = [e1, . . . , en]
and h′ = [e′1, . . . , e
′
n] constitutes an event-ordering bug iff
• h′ is a permutation of events in h,
• if ρ0
h
=⇒ ρn and ρ0 h
′
=⇒ ρ′n, then ρn 6= ρ′n.
Due to the coarse-grained nature of events, targeting multi-
transactional executions, our concurrency model does not
capture reentrancy bugs [36]. Furthermore, for the sake of
tractability, the definition is only concerned with a single
contract at a time, even though involved events may modify
state of other contracts. This means that our notion of EO bugs
only captures the effects on a local state of a contract in focus
and won’t distinguish between states of other contracts.7
6In EVM, function names are not different from other fields of the message,
but here we make this separation explicit for the sake of clarity.
7One could generalize Definition 2, allowing to catch bugs resulting in
transferring money to one beneficiary instead of another, without any local
accounting. In this work, we do not address this class of non-local EO bugs.
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B. The Core Algorithm
ETHRACER basic algorithm systematically enumerates all
traces of up to a bounded length of k events (configurable),
for a given smart contract. One could employ a purely random
dynamic fuzzing approach to generating and testing event
traces. However, even for a single entry point, different input
values may exercise different code paths. In contrast, symbolic
execution is a useful technique to reason about each code path,
rather than enumerating input values, efficiently. One could
consider a purely symbolic approach that checks properties
of code paths encoded fully symbolically, to check for out-
put differences. ETHRACER uses an approach that combines
symbolic analysis of contract code and randomized fuzzing of
event trace combinations in a specific way to find EO bugs.
Symbolic Event Analysis. ETHRACER first performs a syn-
tactic analysis to recover the public functions in the bytecode
of the contract. These functions are externally callable, and
thus, these are entry points for each event. Next, ETHRACER
employs standard dynamic symbolic execution technique to
reason about the outputs of each event separately. For each
event ei, the analysis marks the event inputs as symbolic
and gathers constraints down all paths starting from the
entry point of ei. Modulo implementation caveats (as detailed
in Section V-B), our analysis creates constraints that over-
approximate the set of values that drive down a specified path.
Note that since the symbolic analysis aims to over-approximate
the feasible paths concretely executable under an event, it does
not need to always check the feasibility of each path exactly
using SMT solvers in this phase. As a result of this analysis,
for each event ei, we obtain a vector of symbolic constraints
(as SMT formulae) ~Si that encode path constraints for the set
of execution paths starting from the entry point of ei. The
pairs 〈ei, ~Si〉 is referred to as a symbolic event.
Concretization. Conceptually, symbolic events are con-
cretized in two separate steps. The first concretization step is
standard in DSE system, where concretization aids path explo-
ration. Specifically, the feasibility of each path constraints in
~Si using an off-the-shelf SMT solver. We eliminate symbolic
path constraints for paths that become infeasible. The SMT
solver finds satisfying concrete input values for feasible paths.
By executing these inputs on the blockchain state given as
input to ETHRACER, it can find concrete values of global
symbolic variables read before being clobbered, call targets,
and transaction input contexts. These values can concretize
symbolic constraint in ~Si. This concretization makes the
symbolic constraints less general, but allow pruning away a
lot of false positives that due to assuming infeasible paths or
values of symbolic inputs. All our prioritization and pruning
optimization outlined later in this Section use the outputs of
this concretized symbolic execution for analysis.
The second concretization step aims to create one or more
concrete value for each path that remains in ~Si. The goal of
this step is enumerate all the traces k concrete events long,
and concretely fuzz the contract with these concrete event
traces. We use an SMT solver to find value assignments for
all symbolic variables in each element of ~Si. These concrete
values give us a set of concrete events. Concrete events can be
directly executed on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).
Fuzzing with Concrete Events. The fuzzing starts with the
random trace of k concrete events distinct entry points, and
its creates combinations that permute all pairs of events, then
all triples, quadruples, and so on. If two traces tested result in
differing outputs, we flag the contract as having an EO bug. A
pair of concretely tested traces that exhibit diverging outputs
and are called a witness pair, and reported by ETHRACER
for evidence of EO violations. To reduce the effort of the
human analyst, ETHRACER performs a minimization step on
witness pairs. If the removal of a concrete event from both
traces in a witness pair does not impact the outputs, such an
event is redundant and can be removed. Proceeding this way,
a minimized witness pair is finally reported.
Prioritizing and Pruning. We devise three new optimization
strategies, which cut down the fuzzing space exponentially:
(a) ETHRACER uses its symbolic analysis to infer a hb
relationship between symbolic events after the first concretiza-
tion step. If an concrete event e1 is before e2 in hb, it
implies that re-ordering them will lead to an invalid trace
throwing an exception. Our tool analyzes a set of such con-
crete events symbolically, which is much faster than learning
such relationships through concrete fuzzing. This procedure
is described in Section V-C. Note that this optimization can
have an exponential reduction in concrete fuzzing phase.
Learning an hb relation between even two events can eliminate
generating and testing half of the N ! combinations.8 The
second concretization step, therefore, generate concrete events
that respect the hb relations.
(b) During its symbolic analysis, ETHRACER identifies
the functions that do not read or write any global variables.
ETHRACER further does not consider events from such func-
tions because they cannot interfere with any other event. While
this is a simple observation, in practice, it helps optimization
even further by cutting down what requires symbolic analysis.
(c) When handling asynchronous callbacks (which are
represented by events in our model), the fuzzer prioritizes
generating traces which are linearizable, as explained more
precisely in Section IV-D. It then prioritizes traces with events
making calls to the off-chain services and generates traces
which re-order calling events and its corresponding callback
events independently. If a concrete trace tested gives output
the same as a linearizable trace, it is not reported as a bug.
Section VI-C explains the exponential reduction of these
optimizations on the ERC-20 bug mentioned in Section II with
experimental data.
C. Extracting HB Relations
EVM semantics do not feature programming abstractions
like Java’s synchronized [15] or a rigorous specification
of dynamic event precedence [5], [24], which concurrency
analysis techniques targeting other languages or platforms
8By symmetry, half the combination have (say) event A before B.
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use. That said, smart contract developers impose an intrinsic
ordering on events by engineering ad-hoc synchronization via
a mechanism EVM supports natively: exceptions9 and global
variables. Specifically, the contract may set values for global
variables in the processing of one event, and later check / use
these before performing critical operations under subsequent
event. If the check / use of the global variable results in an
exception, the second event will not lead to valid trace and
the execution of that event will be nullified. Our observation
is that if we can detect these cases, when there is only one
valid ordering between a pair of events, we do not need to test
for any event orderings where there is an invalid order.
These ordering relations are captured formally by a
happens-before relation [21]. In all event traces, if executing
an event e1 before e2 leads to an exception, but executing
e2 before e1 leads to valid (normal) execution, then we say
e2 happens before e1 (denoted hb(e2, e1)). Finally, if neither
from hb(e1, e2) and hb(e2, e1) holds, e1 and e2 can occur in
an event trace in any order and are called independent events.
The precise definition of the notion of happens-before, as used
in this paper, is below.
Definition 3 (Happens-before). For a fixed contract instance
c, we say that two events e1 and e2 are in happens-before
relation hb(e1, e2) with respect to a set of valid event traces
H of c iff for any trace h ∈ H , if h = concat(h1, [e2], h2)
and e1 ∈ h, then e1 ∈ h1. In other words, e1 always precedes
e2 in a trace h ∈ H , in which both e1 and e2 are present.
Recovering the complete hb relation (as defined above) for
a program is difficult even with a powerful symbolic analysis.
Consider a simplified version of a real-world Bounty contract,
shown in Figure 4. The way it is implemented, an event
e1 = 〈donate, . . .〉 will always precede e2 = 〈payout, . . .〉
in any valid execution trace, because once e2 is executed, the
require clause will trigger an exception if more events of
type e1 occur. This achieved by setting the flag bounty_paid
to true in line 10. There are 2 paths in e2 and 4 paths in e1,
and thus a total of 8 combination of event-paths to check in
order to discover the complete hb relation between e1 and e2
statically. Our symbolic analysis can encode the path’s logic
as SMT formula and check both the orders of a 8 pairs using
an SMT solver for differing outputs.
This approach works well for a small number of events
(e.g. 2 events in this example). Extracting the full hb relation
for a larger set of events quickly leads to a combinatorial
explosion of path orders to search. To address this challenge,
our approach infers a “weaker” form of HB-relations, which
operates on pairs of events, considering traces with only two
events. The following definition makes precise our design
choice, and enables a direct implementation strategy.
Definition 4 (Weak happens-before). For a set E of events of
a contract instance c = 〈id ,M, ρ〉 and a blockchain state σ,
such that σ[id ] = ρ, we say that two events e1, e2 ∈ E are in a
weak happens-before relation (whb(e1, e2)) iff (a) ρ
[e1,e2]
====⇒ ρ′
9In Solidity, exceptions are raised via throw, require and assert.
1 contract Bounty {
2 bool public bounty_paid = false;
3 address public proposed_beneficiary = 0x0;
4 mapping (address => bool) public has_donated;
5 mapping (address => uint256) public balances;
6
7 function payout(string _password) {
8 require(!bounty_paid);
9 // More requirements on _password etc
10 bounty_paid = true;
11 proposed_beneficiary.transfer(this.balance);
12 }
13
14 function donate() payable {
15 require(!bounty_paid);
16 // more requirements
17 if (!has_donated[msg.sender]) {
18 has_donated[msg.sender] = true;
19 }
20 balances[msg.sender] += msg.value;
21 }
22 // More functions...
23 }
Fig. 4: Bounty contract with an intrinsic HB relation.
for some contract state ρ′, and (b) ρ
[e2,e1]
====⇒  .
The implementation strategy for extracting weak happens-
before (WHB) is straight-forward. We execute the two differ-
ing orderings of each pair of events in a given trace. If we
observe that one order leads to exception, and other does not,
we inductively learn this relationship. We can also identify
which functions are independent as per the natural extension
of the definition from HB to WHB.
Notice that WHB implies regular HB for traces of two
events, but HB for longer traces can include fewer pairs due
to state changes made by other events in a trace. Using WHB
leads to an under-approximation of the full hb relation, as
it may render more pairs of events non-independent. This
could introduce more false negatives (i.e., will miss some EO-
bugs), but at the advantage of an exponential reduction in trace
combinations to test.
An important final optimization helps the symbolic analysis
of event pairs. ETHRACER builds weak hb-relation for events
pairs that share at least one global variable and at least of
the functions write to the shared variable. Only such functions
when re-ordered may lead to different values of global storage
variables and thus their corresponding events may be in weak
hb-relations. ETHRACER analyzes the symbolic write sets of
program paths, and uses this information to guide which events
to consider during hb analysis.
D. Optimizing for Linearizability Checking
This optimization is based on the observation that certain
orderings of events are well-paired by EVM semantics. When
contract execution adheres to these prescribed paired order-
ings, the results are what the developer likely intended (and
must not be flagged). In fact, all orderings which lead to one
of these intended outputs do not highlight an unintentional
behavior, and need not to be reported. This optimization
8
Time/Block number
c.bet2,  
[sender ↦ s2]̼̻c.bet1,  [sender ↦ s1]̼̻
c.__callback1,  
[ sender ↦ o,
 myid ↦ 1 ]
̼̻
c.__callback2,  
[ sender ↦ o,
 myid = 2 ] ̼̻
( ( ) )
Logical Transaction 1
Logical Transaction 2
e1c e2c e1r e2r
Fig. 5: A call/return event trace in Casino contract.
reduces the witness pairs finally reported to the human analyst,
suppressing results that are likely benign.
At present, ETHRACER uses such optimization for asyn-
chronous call to Oraclize. For interacting with off-chain re-
sources (e.g., stock exchanges, random number generators),
a number of Ethereum contracts use the popular service
Oraclize [31]. Oraclize handles the query offline, by retrieving
the data from the required URLs, and later sends it back to
the asking contract by calling its function __callback in
a separate Ethereum transaction.10 Hence, a call to Oraclize
would “return” via an asynchronous callback.
Here, for each Oraclize call, there is matching return
or callback. Programmers are expected to match returns to
the Oraclize calls, and process accordingly, handling multiple
users. The notion that captures intent (or natural program
reasoning) is linearizability [17]: each pair of matching call-
returns must appear to execute atomically. That is, if two users
issue events that trigger Oraclize calls, then either the first
user’s call-returns are executed before the second user’s, or
the other way around; if their call-return strictly interleave
out-of-order, it leads to an unintended (or unnatural) behavior.
This is evident in the Casino example (Figure 1).
ETHRACER in its fuzzing step recognizes Oraclize calls
and asynchronous returns. It first checks all linearizable traces,
where matching call-return pairs execute atomically. It mem-
oizes the outputs of these linearizable traces as “canonical”
outputs. Then, it generates other possible tracees during its
testing and reports a witness pair only if the outputs are not
equal to all of the canonical outputs. If a trace is found which
does not match any linearized event trace, ETHRACER flags
the contract as having a EO bug, and reports on the closest
linearizable trace in the witness pair. One example of such
non-linearizable trace for the Casino contract is presented
in Figure 5. For completeness, we provide a definition of
linearizable traces, which precisely capture this notion.
Definition 5 (Linearizable event traces). A valid event trace
h = [e1, . . . , en] of a contract instance c = 〈id ,M, ρ0〉 is
linearizable iff a state ρn, such that ρ0
h
=⇒ ρn, can be obtained
by executing a trace h′, which is a permutation of events in
h, such that
1) it preserves the order of call/return events from h;
10A contract calling Oraclize must have a function called __callback.
2) non-overlapping logical transactions in h appear in the
same order, as they appear in h.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
ETHRACER is implemented in about 6,000 lines of Python.
To process a contract, the tool requires as its input either a
contract’s bytecode or its Ethereum address. If the latter is
given, ETHRACER assumes the contract is deployed on the
main Ethereum blockchain and gets its bytecode and current
global storage from the blockchain, and stores it locally. Oth-
erwise, it assumes the contract is not deployed, and thus starts
with empty local storage. An optional input to ETHRACER is
contract’s Solidity source code. If provided, it improves the
readability of the produced reports, allowing ETHRACER to
use function names instead of EVM signatures.11 The tool
reports all pairs of traces that lead to EO bugs.
A. Preprocessing
From the contract’s bytecode, ETHRACER first collects all
the function signatures in it. This is done via a heuristic
search that inspects the beginning of the bytecode, where all
signatures are defined [42], and matches it against predefined
patterns. Alternatively, if Solidity source code is provided,
then the tool directly extracts the signatures from the source
by compiling the code with Solidity compiler solc with the
--hashes switch on.
B. Dynamic Symbolic Execution Engine
ETHRACER relies on standard DSE, improving the open-
source implementation of a recent work [30]. All inputs to the
entry points of contract bytecode are marked symbolic initially.
The symbolic execution starts from the first instruction of a
contract’s bytecode and interprets sequentially the instructions
following the EVM specification [42], with access to running
stack, global storage, and local memory. The DSE engine
keeps two memory maps: a symbolic map and concrete local
map. The local map is initialized with the concrete blockchain
state given as input to ETHRACER. All global variables of
the contract are concretely initialized from the local copy of
the global storage. The DSE engine gathers symbolic values,
branch, and path constraints in the standard way. We check
satisfiability of symbolic constraints using Z3 [9], which can
handle operations on numeric and bit-vector domains. Our
present implementation supports symbolic analysis of 90%
of all EVM opcodes. The unhandled instructions preclude
analysis of a small number of paths in 6% of the contracts
we analyzed.
The analysis aims to over-approximate values in its sym-
bolic path constraints as a default strategy. For instance, when
checking with path feasibility with an SMT solver, if the
solver times out, we assume that the path is feasible. We prune
away paths only if the SMT solver returns UNSAT. We over-
approximate the set of pointer values during the analysis for
symbolic memory by not concretizing it eagerly. Similarly,
11A function signature is an 8-digit hexadecimal number that uniquely
identifies functions when compiled from Solidity source.
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the DSE engine marks return values of CALL instructions
(which invokes functions from other contracts) as symbolic.
During the DSE analysis (and only during this analysis), we
do not concretely execute the externally called contract, but
the symbolic return value over-approximates the behavior.
External calls cannot modify the caller’s contract state, hence
marking only the return value as symbolic is sufficient.
While our symbolic analysis largely over-approximates, it
concretizes in a small number cases which help improving
path coverage. First, when the value of the symbolic variable
is needed for checking path feasibility, we lazily concretize it
from the concrete to drive execution down that branch. Second,
the DSE engine concretizes lookups for key-value stores
(hashmap/hashtable types), which are called “mappings”
in Solidity [38] and implemented using SHA3 as the hash
function. Our baseline system [30], did not have support for
this, and this implementation detail is crucial for finding EO
bugs in many contracts, including the ERC-20 example from
Figure 2. If the lookup key v is symbolic (e.g., it came as a
contract call input), our DSE engine concretizes it to the set of
values assigned to it in concrete executions observed during
DSE. In addition, the first time a symbolic v is accessed in a
write, we assign it a new random concrete value so that the
concrete value set is never empty.
As an example, in Solidity, for a mapping s of type
address => int, the value of s[v] is located in the global
storage at address SHA3(v @ index(s)), where @ denotes
concatenation of words and index(s) returns the identifier
of a variable s in the contract.12 For each index(s), the tool
maintains a list of all concrete keys v seen during the previous
executions. When having to execute SHA3(v @ index(s))
with a symbolic v, it retrieves the list vs of all seen concrete
values of v for index(s), branches the execution on all such
values, and executes concretely SHA3(v @ index(s)) for every
v ∈ vs . In addition, whenever required, ETHRACER generates
a random value for v, adds it to index(s).
Side-Effects & HB Relations. During the DSE analysis,
for each collected function, ETHRACER performs conserva-
tively records locations of all global variables of the contract
to which the function reads or writes. This analysis helps
optimize away functions which do not update global state,
as discussed previously. It aid subsequent extraction of hb
relations even further as explained previously. The functions
that do not read nor write to any shared global variables need
not be considered for hb analysis.
The hb analysis of symbolic paths is straight-forward. Paths
leading to exceptions are identified by special instructions.13
For a pair of symbolic events and corresponding path con-
straints, we check for path feasibility. The SMT solver returns
concrete events that validate if a particular order triggers an
exception.
12Each global variable has an identifier that depends on the order of how
the global variables have been defined in the contract.
13These include instructions that do not have a valid bytecode, or jumps to
unlabelled code indexes (for instance, 0000).
C. Fuzzing Event Traces
Given the set E of all events produced previously, the fuzzer
engine creates all possible subsets of E up to a certain size.14
For each subset, all possible traces, which obey the previously
discovered HB relation, are generated. Each such trace is
executed on a customized EVM instance, which in comparison
to the original EVM (of original Ethereum client) is orders of
magnitudes faster, as it runs without performing the proof-of-
work mining, and does not participate in a message exchange
with other nodes on the network. The customized EVM,
however, can read from the original Ethereum blockchain by
sending queries to Ethereum geth client running on a local
machine and participating in the Ethereum network. Hence,
if ETHRACER processes a contract deployed on the main
Ethereum blockchain, the customized EVM initially reads its
actual global state, stores it locally, and uses this copy for all
sequential reads and writes of the global storage.
After executing each trace, the global storage and the
balance of the contract are saved. Once all traces for a
particular subset have been executed, the tool finds and outputs
a list of pairs of EO-bug traces, i.e., pairs of traces that result
either in different global storage or in different balances. The
tool then performs minimization by creating a set of pairs of
minimal traces of function calls, reproducing the found EO-
bugs. The minimization is done by implementing a simple
shrinking strategy: same events are removed from the pair of
buggy traces, one by one, while checking whether a “smaller”
pair of traces still constitute an EO-bug. In our experience,
the size of the set of minimal traces is significantly smaller
than the length of the full list of buggy traces, so having the
minimization procedure provides a better user experience and
allows for faster confirmation of witnesses by a human.
To further reduce the number of benign violation of
EO, ETHRACER implements an additional simple heuristic.
ETHRACER gives priority to checking all permutations with
distinct events. Permutations that reorder events with the same
entry point but different input values are checked after all
others. The rationale behind this heuristic comes from the
fact that a large number of functions change the global output
state by writing a value that depends on some input parameter.
Thus, calling such functions with different inputs will always
result in different global storage of the contract. This is often
intended behavior, rather than a bug.
D. Checking Linearizability of Event Traces
The linearizability optimizer component of ETHRACER is
triggered on Oraclize-using contracts, It tailored for detecting
a specific kind of EO-bugs, namely linearizability violations
(see Definition 5) during fuzzing. For each contract, the
linearizability optimizer considers only two functions: one
that sends a query to Oraclize and another that receives
the “matching” return from Oraclize. The former can be
arbitrary, but the latter is always declared as a function with
14The maximal size is parametrized, thus it can be increased or reduced;
we tried sizes from 2 to 6 in our experiments.
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(a) Activity of contracts. (b) Recency of contracts. (c) Held balances.
Fig. 6: Statistics for the analyzed contracts. The histogram plot 6a provides the total transactions handled by the flagged
contracts with respect to the block number. From block number 3, 000, 000 to 5, 000, 000, contracts with source code have
seen tremendous increase in the amount of transactions, whereas for contract with only bytecode this number has remained
almost constant. Similarly, histogram plot 6b shows the number of contracts created with respect to block number. As evident,
most of them have been created recently, i.e., after block number 4, 000, 000. Finally, the plot 6c shows the “accumulated”
sum of balances of contracts. The highest 1% contracts according to their balance make up for more than 99% of the ether in
the flagged contracts.
the signature __callback(bytes32 _queryId, string
_result,... ), where _queryId is a unique identifier of
the query to Oraclize.
Even though the calling function can be arbitrary, the
linearizability optimizer finds the matching call/return pair by
inspecting the blockchain in the following way. Each call to
Oraclize writes a unique _queryId to the blockchain called
a log,15 while a client contract also stores this value in its
persistent state (to use it to identify a matching call from
Oraclize). Therefore, for each _queryId, the matching reply
from Oraclize can be found by inspecting the incoming calls
of the analyzed contract: a call that originates from Oraclize
and invokes the __callback function with the required value
of _queryId as first argument is the match. Rather than
producing new contexts, the linearizability optimizer retrieves
them from the blockchain when scanning for all values of the
_queryId parameter.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate ETHRACER to measure how many contracts
are flagged as having EO bugs, i.e., how many show differing
outputs under a different ordering of events. Further, we
measure how much effort the analyst has to spend per contract
to analyze the flagged traces. We asses how EO bugs compare
to existing definitions of transaction re-ordering bugs checked
by the existing OYENTE tool. Lastly, we present real case
studies highlighting efficiency of ETHRACER. We highlight
only important findings in this section and provide more
examples and case studies in Appendix A. We urge the readers
to refer to the Appendix to gain better insights on our results.
15In Solidity, these are called Events, not to be confused with our contract
events from Definition 1.
Evaluation subjects. Around 1% of the smart contracts
deployed on Ethereum have source code. ETHRACER can
directly operate on EVM bytecode and does not require
source. To test the effectiveness of the tool, we select 5, 000
contracts for which Solidity source code16 is available and
another 5, 000 contracts randomly chosen from the Ethereum
blockchain (for which source is unavailable).
ETHRACER takes all these contracts in bytecode form
and analyzes them for synchronization violations. On the
other hand, for analysis of linearizability violations, we find
1, 152 unique contracts on the Ethereum blockchain to which
Oraclize callbacks have occurred. We filter out contracts with
less than two Oraclize queries, and are left with 423 unique
contracts out of which 154 have Solidity source code available.
We analyze these 423 contracts for linearizability violations.
Experimental Setup. We run all our experiments on a Linux
server, with 64GB RAM and 40 CPUs Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5-
2680 v2@2.80GHz. We process the contracts in parallel on
30 cores, with one dedicated core per contract. We set a
timeout of 150 minutes per contract. ETHRACER is configured
to output 3 pairs of events for each pair of functions in the HB
relation from its an analysis component; the timeout per pair
of functions in the hb relation is 2 minutes. For each function
with no event generated in the hb creation phase, ETHRACER
either generates one event or times out in 1 minute. These
events are used for the fuzzing step in ETHRACER. The
outputs of the ETHRACER are a set of pairs of event traces,
flagged as having EO bugs. We plan to release a public artifact
to enable direct reproducibility of the reported experiments.
16We obtain contract source codes from the popular website Etherscan [2],
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Fig. 7: Number of minimal traces in flagged contracts.
A. Efficacy of ETHRACER
ETHRACER flags a total of 789 (7.89%) synchronization
and 47 (11%) linearizability violations in the analyzed smart
contracts, holding hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
Ether over their lifetime. Figure 6 provides statistics on the
transaction volumes, recency and ether held by these contracts.
Synchronization violations. Out of the 10, 000 analyzed
contracts, 789 are flagged as having synchronization bugs. This
shows that a large majority of contracts do not have differing
outputs upon the tested orders. Among the 789 contracts, 674
have source code, which we manually analyze, and 115 are
from the set of contracts without source.
The maximum Ether held by the contracts over their lifetime
sums up to 703, 676, which is approximately 142.5 million
USD.17 A large fraction of this amount belongs to contracts
that are based on the ERC-20 standard, as the example
presented in Section II.
At present, 785 out of 789 contracts are live and currently
hold 307 Ether (62, 321 USD equivalent); for the distribution
of Ether in these contracts). The flagged contracts are transac-
tion intensive as shown in Figure 6a and the volume of pro-
cessed transactions over their lifetime amounts to 1, 649, 192
transactions on the public Ethereum blockchain.
Recent contracts percentage-wise have fewer bugs, presum-
ably due to the rise of automatic analysis tools and manual
audit firms. However, shear increase in the number of deployed
contracts results in larger number of flagged contracts in recent
contracts. This trend can be seen in Figure 6b.
Linearizability violations. Out of the 423 analyzed contracts,
the tool flags 47 contracts for linearizability violations. In the
past, the flagged contracts have held up to 5, 067 Ether (1
million USD equivalent). Currently, 28 of them are live and
hold 862 Ether. The contracts are transaction intensive as well,
as they have handled 55, 946 transactions in their lifetime.
17Calculated at 203 USD per one Ether.
1 contract ERC721 {
2 function addPermission(address _addr) public
3 onlyOwner{
4 allowPermission[_addr] = true;
5 }
6 function removePermission(address _addr) public
7 onlyOwner{
8 allowPermission[_addr] = false;
9 }
10 ...
11 }
Fig. 8: False positive: fragment of an ERC721 contract.
B. Manual Analysis Effort
ETHRACER produces as output a set of pairs of traces
exhibiting EO bugs. As shown in Figure 7, for flagged
contracts with synchronization bugs the tool produces only a
few minimized witness pairs, i.e., on average two, and only a
single pair for the majority of the flagged contracts. Similarly,
the contracts with linearizability bugs have only one witness
pair for all vulnerable contracts. These results highlight that
the post-hoc analysis manual effort is minimal and generally
requires inspection of only a handful of pairs of traces by a
human auditor.
To confirm the simplicity of the post-hoc analysis and to
determine whether the EO violations are intentional (benign)
or buggy, we manually analyze the flagged cases. We take
a 100 randomly chosen contracts flagged for synchronization
violations and all 27 contracts (with source code) flagged for
linearizability violations. For each of the inspected contracts,
we need only a few minutes to confirm or disprove whether
the EO violation is true bug or likely benign.
Synchronization Violations. For the 100 contracts we ana-
lyzed, 52% are closer to the examples presented in Section 2
and we adjudged them to be true bugs. Apart from the example
presented in Section II, we find several other examples of
subtle true EO violations. Two additional examples of such
contracts named Contest and Escrow, are presented in
Appendix A.
We deemed that 48% of the 100 contracts we analyzed
were violations of the EO definition, but likely benign.
These contracts were straight-forward to analyze, as they
have a small set of global variables shared between functions
of the traces which take different values upon re-ordering.
For instance, consider the ERC721 contract shown in Fig-
ure 8. Functions addPermission and removePermission
are called by the contract owner to update the common variable
allowPermission.
ETHRACER indicates an EO bug with both orders of a
pair of events: (addPermission, removePermission). We
adjudge such race conditions to be intentional and benign.
Linearizability Violations. For these violations, among the
47 flagged contracts, 27 have Solidity source code, which we
manually analyze. 23 of these contracts have true and subtle
EO violations, which follow two predominant patterns:
• Unprocessed _queryId: The first class occurs in con-
tracts that do not process _queryId in their __callback
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Fig. 9: Number of functions in flagged contracts.
function. Rather, the contracts assume synchronous nature
of Oraclize, i.e., assume that each query to Oraclize is
immediately followed by a reply from Oraclize. The contract
BlockKing, mentioned in a few previous works [34], is
an example of such contract. We have identified one more
contract, called Gamble, that suffers from a similar mistake.
• Improper check on Ether: This second class of bugs is
more subtle and has not been identified in prior works. It
occurs in contracts similar to our Casino example from
Section II. Upon receipt of a bet from a player, the contract
checks if it has a sufficient amount Ether for payout in
case Oraclize returns value winning for the user, however,
it does not keep track of the total amount of Ether required
for payout of all awaiting players. Therefore, when several
players have open games, and all of them win, the casino
may not be able to pay all of them. On the other hand,
when each of the players participates and gets the result
immediately (i.e., when the case has been linearized), if the
casino cannot pay the player, it does not accept the bet, hence
the balances of the players will be different. We found 21
contracts that have this type of mistake.
Out of 27 contracts flagged for linearizability violations, 4
contracts have EO violations which seem to be benign (or
intended logic) in contracts. Specifically, they have two or
more traces that differ in output dependent on the timestamp
of the mined block.
Summary. ETHRACER produces a small number of concrete
traces that can be analyzed in a few minutes, and more than
half of these correspond to EO violations that we deem to true
bugs. ETHRACER incurs a practical overhead for diagnosing
a dangerous class of errors before deployment.
At this point we would like to mention that among all the
flagged contracts with source code for Synchronization viola-
tions (i.e., 674), we could find 42 contracts which had contacts
of their authors mentioned in their source code. We notified
authors of these contracts and gave a week to take a decision
and reply to us. However, we received no reply from them
in the given time. For the contracts exhibiting Linearizability
violations we couldn’t find any author to contact, from reading
their source code.
C. Performance
About 95% of the contracts require 18.5 minutes of analysis
time with ETHRACER on average per contract, whereas only
5% of them timeout after 150 minutes. Of the 18.5 minutes,
ETHRACER spends about 15 minutes to produce events and
3.5 minutes for fuzzing.
Figure 9 provides a quantitative explanation for this effi-
ciency. It shows the total number of functions in contracts;
one can see that a large number of contracts have over 10
callable functions, thus analyzing all permutations would lead
to prohibitively large number of traces to test concretely.
A core idea in ETHRACER is that of filtering out function
pairs before finding their corresponding event pairs in weak
hb-relations. This technique removes 65% of all pairs on
average in our analyzed contracts. The highest filtration is
achieved in a contract with 138 functions where the tool filters
out all but 2 pairs. The lowest filtration rate is in 11 contracts
where ETHRACER does not filter out any of the 4 found
functions. Apart from 11 contracts out of 10, 000, ETHRACER
provides measurable efficiency gain over the baseline strategy
of enumerating all pairs and checking them symbolically.
An illustrative example. ETHRACER finds the ERC-20 bug
mentioned in Section II in 5 minutes, producing a single
minimized pair of traces to inspect. The tool first collects all 11
functions of the contract. The pure function analysis marks 8
functions as pure, leaving only for 3 functions for re-ordering.
The pure function analysis substantially improves the power
of hb analysis, since only 3 out the 11 functions needed to
be checked for hb relations. Without this optimization, our hb
analysis (Section IV-C) during fuzzing would inspect
(
11
2
)
or
55 pairs instead of 3. After 4 minutes of symbolic analysis to
recover hb relations, ETHRACER creates 7 concrete events as
input to the fuzzer. In 1 minute, the fuzzer analyzes traces
of length ranging from 2 to 6 and it analyzes a total of
2, 560 traces. This number would be 8, 652 without our hb
relation analysis, which has over 3x improvement to concrete
fuzzing in this example. After fuzzing, ETHRACER outputs 43
traces which have bugs and its witness minimization produces
a single pair of traces to inspect. This is precisely the pair
presented in Section II. The output produced by ETHRACER
for this contract is given in Appendix B
Figure 10 shows the correlation between the size of the hb
relation set and the number of potential traces created by the
fuzzer. As shown in the figure, an increase in the number of hb
relations leads to a decrease in the number of possible traces
the fuzzer needs to create and check. For instance, on average
of all analyzed contracts, having a single hb relation reduces
the number of possible traces by nearly 42%. Moreover, the
average number of HB relations produced by ETHRACER for
a contract is nearly 5.5.
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Fig. 10: Impact of the number of HB-related event pairs.
D. Comparing ETHRACER and OYENTE
OYENTE is a symbolic execution analyzer which flags
contracts with two different traces having different Ether flows
(i.e., changes in a contract’s balance) [22], [32]. It tries to
produce contexts m1 and m2 such that traces (e1, e2) and
(e2, e1) result in two different ether flows where e1 = 〈f1,m1〉
and e2 = 〈f2,m2〉. Here, f1 and f2 can be the same function.
It uses our aforementioned baseline strategy of enumerating
all pairs (traces of depth two) and symbolically checking if
the two paths lead to two different balances.
Our definitions of event ordering (EO) may appear similar
to transaction ordering dependency bugs (TOD) defined and
analyzed by the OYENTE tool. There is, however, several
definitional and technical differences between the two tools:
1) OYENTE does not reason about linearizability violations;
transaction ordering dependency bugs are a strict subset of
synchronization EO violations.
2) OYENTE detects two paths with different send instructions,
which is unlike EO bugs, characterized by observational
differences in the final output states. OYENTE does not
account for global state changes other than account balances
interacting in a transaction. TOD detections by OYENTE,
thus, may include two traces sending to the same recipient,
causing no modifications to state other than balances.
3) OYENTE checks for differences between pairs of traces
to prevent combinatorial explosion in path space analysis.
ETHRACER can analyze any combination of traces, and uses
a default limit of 6 for presented experiments (but it can be
increased). The key reason for its scalability is the use of
its HB-relation analysis and analysis optimizations.
4) OYENTE only reports symbolic path constraints responsible
for TOD, without giving concrete inputs which exhibit the
bug; this is unlike ETHRACER which produces concrete and
minimized event traces for the analyst to inspect.
Experimental Comparison. To enable a manual analysis of
results, we compared ETHRACER and OYENTE on 5, 000
contracts with available Solidity source code with OYENTE
(retrieved on April 27, 2018) and ETHRACER. First, OYENTE
has no notion of linearizability and thus it detects none of
violating contracts that ETHRACER flags in this category. For
synchronization violations, ETHRACER flags 674 contracts,
while OYENTE flags 251 cases when its internal default
timeout is set to 150 minutes (same as ETHRACER) and in
online mode.18 A larger timeout does not advantage Oyente,
since it terminates for all tested contracts in this timeout.
Out of the 251 contracts, 78 are flagged by ETHRACER
as well. We manually inspect all the remaining 173 contracts
flagged by OYENTE. We find that all these cases are false
EO violations — this confirms that ETHRACER finds all of
true TOD violations flagged by OYENTE, and finds more than
double of synchronization violations which extend beyond
TOD bugs as well. We find that OYENTE flags TOD false
positives mainly due to two reasons through manual analysis
of source code. First, OYENTE assumes that different Ether
flows always send Ether to different addresses, which is often
not the case. Second, in contracts with zero balance, all Ether
flows can only send zero Ether, thus they do not differ in
output balances although oyente flags them incorrectly.
VII. RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
Our work generalizes the class of bugs arising due to non-
deterministic scheduling of concurrent transactions. The work
by Luu et al. [22] identified a specific kind of synchronization
violation related to balance updates, and checked for differ-
ences across only a pair of paths. Our work extends this to
longer traces and full state differences, finding nearly 4x more
true EO violations of previously unknown bugs. Our class of
bugs are unrelated to liveness or safety properties identified
more recently by symbolic execution techniques [18], [19],
[30]. At a technical level, these works provide robust symbolic
execution systems which is equivalent to our assumed starting
baseline technique. However, in this work, our techniques are
complementary to the baseline, directly addressing the com-
binatorial blowup due to checking traces of large lengths. To
show this empirically, we compared directly to a maintained
and the open-source OYENTE that operates on EVM bytecode
in Section VI-D. Alternative systems such as ZEUS [18] could
be used instead of OYENTE, but ZEUS is not publicly available
and operates on Solidity source rather than EVM bytecode.
It has been later speculated that many of similar issues,
stemming from the non-deterministic transactional nature of
smart contracts can be thought of in terms of shared-memory
concurrency [34]. For instance, TOD could be considered as
a notion of an event race [12], [33], while DAO and mishan-
dled responses from linearizability optimizer service would
manifest a violation of logical atomicity [16], [17]. While the
knowledge of some of those issues has been accumulated by
the community [8], we are not aware of any tool that would
implement a principled approach to detect them at scale.
The most related work to our approach to finding lin-
earizability violations specifically, is the dynamic analysis by
18In the online mode, OYENTE reads the values of the global variables from
the actual blockchain, while in offline, it assumes they are symbolic variables.
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Grossman et al. [16] for detecting of DAO-like re-entrancy
vulnerabilities [10], [36]. Their work checks for a specific lin-
earizability property of Effectively Callback Freeness (ECF): a
contract c is ECF iff for any transaction involving a reentrant
call to c one can construct an equivalent transaction with with-
out reentrant calls. Their dynamic analysis employs the notion
of Invocation Order Constraint (IOC) graph, which only
captures the fine-grained shape of a contract execution within
a single transaction. Verifying ECF dynamically is drastically
simpler than challenge tackled by ETHRACER, as ECF entails
checking the commutativity reads/writes of functions under a
single transaction execution. In this paper, we are interested
in handling multi-transactional executions and the associated
combinatorial blowup associated. Our notion of hb-relations
and our dynamic symbolic analysis are entirely different. Con-
sequently, ETHRACER finds 47 linearizability errors and 674
synchronization errors in about ten thousand contracts, none of
which are reported in the work by Grossman et al. [16]. Their
work finds 9 contracts which are vulnerable to re-entrancy
bugs on the Ethereum public blockchain, which fall outside
the goals and definition of EO violations.
A concurrent work reports on the SERVOIS [4] tool for
automatically generating commutativity conditions from data-
structure specifications has been successfully used to confirm
the presence of a known linearizability violation in a simple
Oraclize-using contract BlockKing [34]. However, SERVOIS
can only work with an object encoded in a tailored domain-
specific language, thus, it cannot be applied for automatically
detecting bugs at scale of an entire blockchain.
Other approaches based on symbolic analysis of Solidity
source code or EVM implementations have been employed to
detect known bugs from a standard “smart contract vulnerabil-
ity checklist” [3], [11], [23] in tools, such as MYTHRILL [26],
[27], SMARTCHECK [37], SECURIFY [41], and MANTI-
CORE [25], none of which addressed EO bugs.
Our work shares similarity to a vast body of research on
checking linearizability and data race detection in traditional
programming languages [5]–[7], [14], [24], [28]. One might
expect that some of those tools could be immediately ap-
plicable for the same purpose to smart contracts. The main
obstacle to do so is that, unlike existing well-studied concur-
rency models (sequential consistency [20], Android [5], etc),
Ethereum contracts do not come with the formally specified
model of explicit synchronization primitives or have explicit
programming abstractions. Because of this, our procedure
for inferring intrinsic hb relations is considerably different
from prior works. We believe our approach lays out useful
abstractions for future works investigating concurrency in
smart contracts.
Future Work: As noted in Section IV-A, races in a con-
tract can be manifested not only by execution effects on its
local state. Other vulnerabilities involve non-determinism in
choosing a recipient for transferred funds or logging (aka
EVM events). It is possible to extend ETHRACER’s model and
implementation to account for those bugs while fuzzing wrt.
constructed hb relations, and we plan to do so in the future.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have studied event-ordering bugs in Ethereum smart
contracts by exploiting their similarity to two classic notions in
concurrent programs: linearizability and synchronization vio-
lations. We have provided a formal model for these violations.
We have shown how to infer intrinsic happens-before relations
from code, and how to use such relations to shrink the search
space when searching for bugs.
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APPENDIX
A. Case Studies: True positives
In the sequel we present two case study examples of true
positives of synchronization bugs.
Contest. The contract from Figure 11 defines a Contest19in
which users can participate and subsequently vote for certain
participants. The voting happens only after participation dead-
line (line 5). Once the voting deadline is met, the contract may
be closed, resulting in distribution of prizes to the participants
with maximal number of votes and to a few lucky voters.
ETHRACER run on this contract outputs the minimal EO
bug
• (participate, vote, determineluckyVoters)
• (participate, determineluckyVoters, vote)
19This is a simplified version of the original contract available at http://
etherscan.io/address/0x325476448021c96c4bf54af304ed502bb7ad0675#code.
1 function participate() {
2 participated[msg.sender]=true;
3 }
4 function vote(address candidate) {
5 if(now < deadlineParticipation || now >=
deadlineVoting || voted[msg.sender] || !
participated[candidate])
6 throw;
7 else{
8 voters.push(msg.sender);
9 voted[msg.sender] = true;
10 numVotes[candidate]++;
11 }
12 }
13 function determineLuckyVoters() {
14 for(uint i = 0; i < nLuckyVoters; i++)
15 luckyVoters.push(voters[ random(voters.length)
]);
16 }
17 function distributePrizes() {
18 for(uint8 j = 0; j < luckyVoters.length; j++)
19 luckyVoters[j].send(amount);
20 // also sends Ether to the top candidates from
numVotes
21 ...
22 }
23 function close(){
24 if( now >= deadlineVoting ){
25 determineLuckyVoters();
26 distributePrizes();
27 }
28 }
29 ...
Fig. 11: A fragment of the contract Contest
When the function determineLuckyVoters is called,
the luckyVoters array is updated with a new lucky voter
selected pseudo-randomly from the voters array in line 15.
So, in the first trace after an account votes for a partic-
ipant the voters array is updated with the new accounts’
address before calling determineLuckyVoters, however, in
the second trace, the voters array is not updated when the
determineLuckyVoters is called. This leads to different
voters array for random selection of luckyVoters for both
traces. Hence, the final list of luckyVoters is different for both
traces. In order to exploit this bug, the first voter can always
call this function and add him to the lucky voters array to get
the award. In fact, determineLuckyVoters function should
be called only after the voting deadline for the contest to be
fair for all the voters.
A simple fix to this bug would be to make the deter-
mineLuckyVoter private and only be called inside the close
function.
ETHRACER starts with 29 functions i.e., 812 possible pairs
of functions and narrows it down to 10 potential hb pairs.
Finally, it generates only 10 events in 10mins and feeds them
to the fuzzer. In 2min Fuzzer outputs only 2 minimal traces of
depth 3 with one of them capturing this bug. It also outputs a
total of 9, 592 traces of depths varying from 3 to 6 which have
an EO bug. So, a developer has to analyze only two traces to
realize the subtle bug.
Escrow Contract. Consider the fragment of Escrow con-
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1 contract Escrow {
2 mapping(address => uint) public escrowFee;
3 EscrowStruct memory currentEscrow;
4 ...
5 function setEscrowFee(uint fee) {
6 require (fee >= 1 && fee <= 100);
7 escrowFee[msg.sender] = fee;
8 }
9
10 function newEscrow(address sellerAddress,
11 address escrowAddress) payable {
12 require(msg.value > 0 && msg.sender !=
escrowAddress);
13 //Store escrow details in memory
14 EscrowStruct memory currentEscrow;
15 currentEscrow.buyer = msg.sender;
16 currentEscrow.seller = sellerAddress;
17 currentEscrow.escrow_agent = escrowAddress;
18 currentEscrow.amount = msg.value -
19 escrowFee[escrowAddress] * msg.value
/ 1000;
20 // More manipulations with currentEscrow
21 ...
22 }
23 ...
24 }
Fig. 12: A fragment of the contract Escrow.
tract20 in Figure 12. The contract facilitate Escrow transactions
between a buyer, a seller, and an escrow agent. A small fee
(called EscrowFee) is associated with every escrow agent
and is paid by a buyer for using the service. The function
newEscrow provides the money storage functionality and
setEscrowFee is used by an escrow agent to set its escrow
fee.
ETHRACER indicates the minimal EO bug
• (newEscrow, setEscrowFee)
• (setEscrowFee, newEscrow)
Notice that both these functions rely on the mapping
escrowFee, by reading and writing to it, which corresponds
to the classical notion of an event race. Generally, an escrow
agent would set a fee before between a buyer and a seller
transact. So, setEscrowFee has to be called by agent before
buyer calls newEscrow. However, the contract allows a buyer
to call newEscrow before any fee is set to the escrow address,
effectively allowing the buyer to forfeit the payment of fee to
the escrow agent.
B. The Output of ETHRACER on ERC-20
The following display shows the output of ETHRACER on
one single buggy instance of the ERC-20 smart contract. Note,
this is the list of all pairs of histories that constitute EO bugs
(the list of minimized pairs consist of a single pair and it is
given in Section II.)
Events
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 : {’tx_value’: ’0’, ’tx_caller’: ’cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686’, ’name’: ’transfer’,
’tx_input’: ’a9059cbb0000000000000000000000006bb8742b27231e22b8f194d4a0737bdeec14c4ca
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001’}
1 : {’tx_caller’: ’cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686’, ’name’: ’approve’,
’tx_blocknumber’: ’493e00’, ’tx_value’: ’0’, ’tx_timestamp’: ’5a5c001d’,
’tx_input’: ’095ea7b3000000000000000000000000cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001’}
2 : {’tx_caller’: ’cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686’, ’name’: ’transferFrom’,
’tx_blocknumber’: ’493e00’, ’tx_value’: ’0’, ’tx_timestamp’: ’5a5c001d’,
20The full code of the contract is available at https://etherscan.io/address/
0x1c02ce498dc6d0d6ef05a253e021258b07eeba91#code.
’tx_input’: ’23b872dd000000000000000000000000cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686
0000000000000000000000008bad998271c5560b47917b6fd819fd20cf03e789
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001’}
3 : {’tx_caller’: ’cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686’, ’name’: ’approve’,
’tx_blocknumber’: ’493e00’, ’tx_value’: ’0’, ’tx_timestamp’: ’5a5c001d’,
’tx_input’: ’095ea7b3000000000000000000000000cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003’}
4 : {’tx_caller’: ’cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686’, ’name’: ’transferFrom’,
’tx_blocknumber’: ’493e00’, ’tx_value’: ’0’, ’tx_timestamp’: ’5a5c001d’,
’tx_input’: ’23b872dd000000000000000000000000cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686
0000000000000000000000008bad998271c5560b47917b6fd819fd20cf03e789
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003’}
5 : {’tx_caller’: ’cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686’, ’name’: ’transferFrom’,
’tx_blocknumber’: ’493e00’, ’tx_value’: ’0’, ’tx_timestamp’: ’5a5c001d’,
’tx_input’: ’23b872dd000000000000000000000000cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686
000000000000000000000000cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001’}
6 : {’tx_caller’: ’cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686’, ’name’: ’transferFrom’,
’tx_blocknumber’: ’493e00’, ’tx_value’: ’0’, ’tx_timestamp’: ’5a5c001d’,
’tx_input’: ’23b872dd000000000000000000000000cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686
000000000000000000000000cee827be9b520a485db84d1f09cc0a99ea878686
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003’}
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HB Relations
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1, 2), (3, 4), (1, 5), (3, 6)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full EO pairs: 43
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 : approve approve transferFrom
1 2 3 : approve transferFrom approve
------------------------------------------------------------
1 0 3 2 : approve transfer approve transferFrom
1 2 0 3 : approve transferFrom transfer approve
------------------------------------------------------------
1 0 3 2 : approve transfer approve transferFrom
1 2 3 0 : approve transferFrom approve transfer
------------------------------------------------------------
1 0 3 2 : approve transfer approve transferFrom
0 1 2 3 : transfer approve transferFrom approve
------------------------------------------------------------
1 0 3 2 : approve transfer approve transferFrom
1 0 2 3 : approve transfer transferFrom approve
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 0 3 : approve transferFrom transfer approve
1 3 0 2 : approve approve transfer transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 0 3 : approve transferFrom transfer approve
1 3 2 0 : approve approve transferFrom transfer
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 0 3 : approve transferFrom transfer approve
0 1 3 2 : transfer approve approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 0 2 : approve approve transfer transferFrom
1 2 3 0 : approve transferFrom approve transfer
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 0 2 : approve approve transfer transferFrom
0 1 2 3 : transfer approve transferFrom approve
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 0 2 : approve approve transfer transferFrom
1 0 2 3 : approve transfer transferFrom approve
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 0 : approve transferFrom approve transfer
1 3 2 0 : approve approve transferFrom transfer
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 0 : approve transferFrom approve transfer
0 1 3 2 : transfer approve approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
0 1 2 3 : transfer approve transferFrom approve
1 3 2 0 : approve approve transferFrom transfer
------------------------------------------------------------
0 1 2 3 : transfer approve transferFrom approve
0 1 3 2 : transfer approve approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 0 : approve approve transferFrom transfer
1 0 2 3 : approve transfer transferFrom approve
------------------------------------------------------------
0 1 3 2 : transfer approve approve transferFrom
1 0 2 3 : approve transfer transferFrom approve
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 5 2 : approve approve transferFrom transferFrom
1 5 3 2 : approve transferFrom approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 5 0 : approve approve transferFrom transferFrom transfer
1 2 3 0 5 : approve transferFrom approve transfer transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 5 0 : approve approve transferFrom transferFrom transfer
0 1 2 3 5 : transfer approve transferFrom approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 5 0 : approve approve transferFrom transferFrom transfer
1 2 3 5 0 : approve transferFrom approve transferFrom transfer
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 5 0 : approve approve transferFrom transferFrom transfer
1 0 2 3 5 : approve transfer transferFrom approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 5 0 : approve approve transferFrom transferFrom transfer
1 2 0 3 5 : approve transferFrom transfer approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 0 5 : approve approve transferFrom transfer transferFrom
1 2 3 0 5 : approve transferFrom approve transfer transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 0 5 : approve approve transferFrom transfer transferFrom
0 1 2 3 5 : transfer approve transferFrom approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 0 5 : approve approve transferFrom transfer transferFrom
1 2 3 5 0 : approve transferFrom approve transferFrom transfer
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 0 5 : approve approve transferFrom transfer transferFrom
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1 0 2 3 5 : approve transfer transferFrom approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 2 0 5 : approve approve transferFrom transfer transferFrom
1 2 0 3 5 : approve transferFrom transfer approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 5 3 2 0 : approve transferFrom approve transferFrom transfer
1 0 3 5 2 : approve transfer approve transferFrom transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 5 3 2 0 : approve transferFrom approve transferFrom transfer
1 3 0 5 2 : approve approve transfer transferFrom transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 5 3 2 0 : approve transferFrom approve transferFrom transfer
0 1 3 5 2 : transfer approve approve transferFrom transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 0 5 : approve transferFrom approve transfer transferFrom
0 1 3 2 5 : transfer approve approve transferFrom transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 0 5 : approve transferFrom approve transfer transferFrom
1 0 3 2 5 : approve transfer approve transferFrom transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3 0 5 : approve transferFrom approve transfer transferFrom
1 3 0 2 5 : approve approve transfer transferFrom transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
0 1 2 3 5 : transfer approve transferFrom approve transferFrom
0 1 3 2 5 : transfer approve approve transferFrom transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
0 1 2 3 5 : transfer approve transferFrom approve transferFrom
1 0 3 2 5 : approve transfer approve transferFrom transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
0 1 2 3 5 : transfer approve transferFrom approve transferFrom
1 3 0 2 5 : approve approve transfer transferFrom transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 0 3 5 2 : approve transfer approve transferFrom transferFrom
1 5 0 3 2 : approve transferFrom transfer approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 0 3 5 2 : approve transfer approve transferFrom transferFrom
1 0 5 3 2 : approve transfer transferFrom approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
0 1 3 2 5 : transfer approve approve transferFrom transferFrom
1 0 2 3 5 : approve transfer transferFrom approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
0 1 3 2 5 : transfer approve approve transferFrom transferFrom
1 2 0 3 5 : approve transferFrom transfer approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 0 5 2 : approve approve transfer transferFrom transferFrom
1 5 0 3 2 : approve transferFrom transfer approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
1 3 0 5 2 : approve approve transfer transferFrom transferFrom
1 0 5 3 2 : approve transfer transferFrom approve transferFrom
------------------------------------------------------------
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